Commentators suggest that to survive in developed economies manufacturing firms have to move up the value chain, innovating and creating ever more sophisticated products and services, so they do not have to compete on the basis of cost. While this strategy is proving increasingly popular with policy makers and academics there is limited empirical evidence to explore the extent to which it is being adopted in practice. And if so, what the impact of this servitization of manufacturing might be. This paper seeks to fill a gap in the literature by presenting empirical evidence on the range and extent of servitization. Data are drawn from the OSIRIS database on 10,028 firms incorporated in 25 different countries. The paper presents an analysis of these data which suggests that: [i] manufacturing firms in developed economies are adopting a range of servitization strategies -12 separate approaches to servitization are identified; [ii] these 12 categories can be used to extend the traditional three options for servitization -product oriented Product-Service Systems, use oriented Product-Service Systems and result oriented Product-Service Systems, by adding two new categories "integration oriented Product-Service Systems" and "service oriented Product-Service Systems"; [iii] while the manufacturing firms that have servitized are larger than traditional manufacturing firms in terms of sales revenues, at the aggregate level they also generate lower profits as a % of sales; [iv] these findings are moderated by firm size (measured in terms of numbers of employees). In smaller firms servitization appears to payoff while in larger firms it proves more problematic; and [v] there are some hidden risks associated with servitization -the sample contains a greater proportion of bankrupt servitized firms than would be expected.
Introduction
How can manufacturing based in developed countries compete in today's global economic system? Data suggest that US manufacturers have to cut the costs of their products by 30% to compete with Chinese producers (Wu et al., 2006) . Add to this the market opportunities offered by emerging economies and the burgeoning regulation and legislation imposed on firms based in the European Union, and it is little surprise that offshoring is becoming a key strategy for manufacturing firms.
Is this process of offshoring an inevitable one? Is it simply a consequence of globalisation and the industrialisation of emerging economies (Friedman, 2005) ? If so, what future does manufacturing have in the US, the UK, or in any other developed economy, for that matter.
Already over 80% of people employed in the UK and the US are now employed in the service sector (Spohrer and Maglio, 2008) . Should developed economies abandon manufacturing and accept that the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was right all those years ago when she claimed that developed economies could live on services?
The problem with headline grabbing figures such as these is that they mask the real trends that underlie the data. In fact the boundaries between manufacturing and service firms are breaking down across the globe. As they have been for years. Rolls-Royce Aerospace no longer simply sells aero engines. Now it offers a total care package, where customers buy the capability the engines deliver -"power by the hour". Rolls-Royce retains responsibility for risk and maintenance, generating revenues by making the engine available for use. But even before Rolls-Royce changed its business model and adopted "power by the hour", the firm still used to sell spares and offer repair and overhaul services. Indeed one could legitimately ask whether Rolls-Royce -or any similar manufacturing firm -has ever been a pure manufacturing firm. If the business has always sold spares and offered repair and overhaul services then it has always offered a combination of product and service. Similar examples can be drawn from a wide variety of sectors. Some traditional manufacturing firms, such as IBM, have fundamentally reinvented themselves as service businesses, moving away from the production of hardware to offer business solutions. Yet others have integrated service operations with traditional manufacturing. BP and Shell both manufacture oil, yet they also both run extensive service retail operations.
The point is that to survive manufacturing firms appear rarely to remain as pure manufacturing firms. Instead they move beyond manufacturing and offer services and solutions, often delivered through their products, or at least in association with them. This trend to servitization was first discussed by Vandermerwe and Rada in the late 1980s, but appears to have received relatively little attention in the mainstream engineering and management literatures (Baines et al., 2007; Tukker and Tischner, 2006; Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988) . Clearly there are notable exceptions (Davies et al., 2006; Tukker and van Halen, 2003) , but these exceptions are generally based on case evidence and many of them focus on the potential environmental benefits of product-service systems as oppose to their commercial advantages (Cook et al., 2006; Goedkoop et al., 1999; Manzini and Verzzoli, 2002; Mont and Plepys, 2003; Mont, 2004; and Morelli, 2002) .
Increasingly new technologies, especially those associated with information and communications technologies are becoming an important enabler of servitization. Developments -especially in data capture and information processing -allow manufacturing firms to develop new business models, exploiting the potential of informated products. Concepts such as intelligent vehicle health management (IVHM) and remote product sensing have entered the management lexicon (Baroth et al., 2001) . It is for these reasons that servitization should not simply be seen as a variant of vertical integration, although clearly one way of adding services is through vertical integration. Hence the calls in the business strategy literature for manufacturing firms to go downstream (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) .
Despite all of the discussion about the importance of servitization there is remarkably little empirical evidence that explores the phenomenon. It is this gap in the literature which this paper seeks to address, by presenting an empirical analysis of the servitization of manufacturing. The paper seeks to explore questions such as: to what extent are manufacturing firms servitizing? If they are servitizing, how are they servitizing and do the observed trends vary depending on firm size and/or country of firm incorporation? The contribution of the paper lies in the fact that it is one of the first to unpack the notion of servitization empirically.
Theoretical Background: Dimensions of Servitization
The notion of servitization was first introduced by Vandermerwe and Rada in the late 1980s (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988) . They argued that there were three reasons why manufacturing firms should servitize -(i) to lock out competitors; (ii) to lock in customers and (iii) to increase the level of differentiation. In additional to these strategic rationales for servitization, other authors have posed economic and environmental rationales (Goedkoop et al., 1999; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) . One particularly strong rationale for firms that provide complex engineered products is the installed base argument, where ratios of installed-base-to-new-units of 13 to 1 for automobiles, 15 to 1 for civil aircraft and 22 to 1 for locomotives are quoted (Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) . Clearly with such market structures, especially when product life cycles have extended, it makes economic sense to the manufacturer of the original equipment to offer through life support and servicing. An alternative rationale is provided -especially from a customer perspective -when one considers risk (Slack, 2005) . Governments across the world are now declaring that they will contract for capability rather than buy specific products (Ministry of Defence, 2005) . The UK defence industrial strategy makes it clear that the Ministry of Defence is interested in procuring the capability to carry out operations, rather than the physical equipment itself. Hence the growth in outsourced support services offered by firms such as BAe and Rolls-Royce. As Slack (2005) points out, this trend has advantages for both suppliers and customers. From a supplier perspective, servitization of a way of increasing sales revenues, while from a customer perspective servitization offers a route of reducing risk and decreasing or a least stabilising and making predictable maintenance and support costs.
In parallel to the discussions in the management and economics literature, the environmental literature has alighted on servitization as a route to increase environmental performance (Goedkoop et al., 1999) . The core thesis is that it is possible to reduce the adverse environmental impact of products if firms change their business models and customers revise their conceptions of ownership.
An oft quoted illustration is the rented washing machine. Customers no longer buy washing machines, but instead they rent them and pay a fixed fee per washing cycle. The revised business model means that it is in the customers' interest to minimise the number of washes they undertakethey pay less as a consequence. It is also in the provider's interest to maximise the product lifecycle.
Once the machine is installed the provider does not want to have to undertake any maintenance. This revised business model changes the incentives for both the customer and providerencouraging both parties to pursue courses of action that minimise the environmental impact of the product (Mont and Plepys, 2003; Mont, 2004) .
At a more abstract and theoretical level each of these rationales for servitization -strategic, economic and environmental -can be linked back to the basics of competitive strategy, in general, and the Porter's five forces in particular (Porter, 1980) . Servitization is seen by many as one of the best ways of manufacturing firms in developed economies addressing the five forces that influence an industry's dynamics and its inherent profitability (Porter and Ketels, 2003) . It is for these reasons that authors have been exhorting manufacturing firms to "go downstream" and "capture the value of supplementary services" (Anderson and Narus, 1995; Wise and Baumgartner, 1999) .
In the future these calls are likely to grow louder, not least because the convergence of data availability and information processing technology opens up radical new business opportunities to manufacturers. This convergence is aptly illustrated by Sir John Rose, Chief Executive of RollsRoyce, who explains how the Rolls-Royce TotalCare service offering works:
"With the real-time data we receive via satellites, we can identify an 'event' and our engineers can make remote diagnoses. Under normal circumstances, after an engine gets hit by lightning you would have to land the plane, call in an engineer, do a visual inspection, and make a decision about how much damage might have been done and whether the plane has to be delayed in order to do a repair. But remember, these airlines do not have much turnaround time. If this plane is delayed, you throw off the crews, you drop out of your position to fly back home. It gets very costly. We can monitor and analyse engine performance automatically in real time, with our engineers making decisions about exactly what is needed by the time the plane has landed. And if we can determine by all the information we have about the engine that no intervention or even inspection is needed, the airplane can return on schedule, and that saves our customers time and money" -quoted in Friedman, pp 199-200 (Friedman, 2005) .
New business models for manufacturers, where the operational capability delivered is underpinned by data collection and information processing capabilities, as well as changed notions of ownership and asset management, have massive implications for many of the traditional operations management frameworks and philosophies. Where, in the strategy frameworks, for example, do we take account of risk and asset ownership? To what extent have members of the management community paid attention to questions of business model and incentive design and the implications of these for customer behaviour?
Research Methodology
As the previous section shows, while there has been some discussion of the servitization of manufacturing, there is a paucity of empirical research concerning the phenomenon and that which does exist raises the question of a service paradox, namely that it appears more difficult for firms to make incremental profits by adding services than might be expected (Gebauer et al., 2005; Reinartz and Ulaga, 2008) . To address these issues the current study seeks to explore empirically the phenomenon of servitization. The data used in the study is drawn from the OSIRIS database which contains financial data for 44,000 publicly listed companies from around the world. Data were downloaded from the database in the first week of January 2007. The initial search involved identifying all companies with primary or secondary US SIC codes in the range 10-39 inclusive, effectively all of the SIC codes relating to manufacturing firms (see Table 1 ). This search resulted in the identification of 22,952 companies. The second search involved adding a control from company size. Only companies with over 100 employees were included in the sample. This resulted in the sample being reduced to 12,521 companies.
Insert Table 1 around here In essence a ground theory approach was taken to the coding of the data (Glasser and Strauss, 1967) . The coding was carried out manually by a single coder. The OSIRIS dataset contains a field "description and history" for each firm. This field includes a text based description of the firm, detailing its history and main activities. The coder reviewed the descriptions of each of the first 50 firms in the dataset, seeking to identify words or phrases that could be used to establish whether the firms were "pure manufacturers", "servitized manufacturers" or "pure service". The distinguishing words and phrases were documented in a code book which was used subsequently to categorise all of the firms in the sample. The Siemens example can be contrasted with PetroChina -another of the firms included in the dataset. PetroChina's business description says that the firm is "principally engaged in a broad range of petroleum and natural gas-related activities" and hence PetroChina is classified as a pure manufacturing firm. Interestingly, despite the fact that all of the firms selected had been assigned a primary SIC code that related to manufacturing, some firms have clearly been allocated the wrong SIC code. For example, The Brink's Company, another firm in the dataset is described as follows:
"The Brink's Company, conducts business in the security industry. The services offered by the Company include armoured-car transportation, automated teller machine (ATM) servicing, currency and deposit processing, coin sorting and wrapping, and arranging the secure air transportation of valuables". The Brink's Company is clearly a service firm that has been misallocated a manufacturing related SIC code. For the purposes of this study, such firms are classified as pure service firms and omitted from the analysis.
During the manual coding process the coder developed a codebook of words and phrases used in the business descriptions. Frequently mentioned services included: consulting services; design and development services; financial services; installation and implementation services; leasing services; maintenance and support services; outsourcing and operating services; procurement services; property and real estate; retail and distribution services; systems and solutions; and transportation and trucking services.
Of course these 12 services are essentially pragmatic in their description. They reflect the language that business uses to describe its range of activities, so it is worth reflecting on how well they map onto the extant literature. Much of the servitization literature makes an important, albeit usually implicit distinction between four concepts: (i) the product-service system, (ii) servitization, (iii) the servitized organisation that supports the product-service system and (iv) the global value system that supports the product-service system. At a more detailed level these four concepts can be defined as 1 :
 A Product-Service System is an integrated product and service offering that delivers value in use.
 Servitization involves the innovation of an organisation's capabilities and processes so that it can better create mutual value through a shift from selling product to selling Product-Service Systems.
 A Servitized Organisation designs, builds and delivers one or more integrated product and service offerings that deliver value in use.
 The Global Value System is the globally distributed network of suppliers, customer and partners who have to co-operate to ensure that integrated product and service offerings deliver value in use.
Traditionally three different forms of Product-Service System have been discussed product oriented PSS, use oriented PSS and result oriented PSS (Hockerts and Weaver, 2002) . In product oriented
Product-Service Systems ownership of the tangible product is transferred to the customer, but additional services directly related to the product are provided by the manufacturer. For use oriented
Product-Service Systems ownership of the tangible product is retained by the service provider, who sells the functions of the product, via modified distribution and payment systems, such as sharing, pooling, and leasing. While in result oriented Product-Service Systems, the PSS replaces services for products -e.g. voicemail service replacing answering machines.
Some of the 12 pragmatic types of service identified above map clearly onto these three categories of Product-Service System, e.g. design and development services; installation and implementation services; and maintenance and support services map onto product-oriented PSS, but it appears that an extension of the classification scheme is required to fully represent the range of servitization strategies being pursued by firms. This extension involves adding two new categories -"integration oriented PSS" and "service oriented PSS". Integration oriented PSS result when firms seek to add services by going downstream and vertically integrating. Service oriented PSS result when firms add services to products, by integrating those services into the product, e.g. Intelligent
Vehicle Health Monitoring services. Table 2 shows this extended categorisation framework, which identifies five options for servitization, an important contribution of this paper.
Insert Table 2 around here
To prosecute the coding the researcher had to return to the pragmatic descriptions used by the businesses in their descriptions rather than the more theoretical classification shown in Table 2 .
Using the 12 sets of terms and phrases identified through the grounded theory approach [and their variants as keywords] an automated coding process was developed using the Excel SEARCH function. Strings of words that identified whether firms offered specific services -e.g.
IF(ISNUMBER(SEARCH("consult*",$D4)),1,0) -were developed and used to automatically code the first 50 firms that had been manually coded previously.
To check the effectiveness of the automated coding process a comparison between the manual coding and the automated coding was carried out. Every discrepancy was examined and the reason for it identified. This process resulted in some modifications to the search strings, with additional phrases being introduced as appropriate. At the end of this process 96 coding discrepancies between the original manual coding and the automated coding remained [12.8% of total codings]. 57.3% of these were due to errors in the original manual coding, leaving 5.5%
coding errors caused by the automatic process. Further modification of the search strings made the coding errors increase, so at this the search strings were frozen and applied to the entire data set.
A conservative approach to coding was adopted. All firms were automatically classified as pure manufacturing firms unless there was clear evidence that they should be classified either as servitized firms or pure service firms.
Having completed the automatic coding a random sample of firms was selected and the codings reviewed. No significant miscodings were identified at this stage, so the coded data were imported into STATA for further statistical analysis.
The Extent and Impact of Servitization
As mentioned previously the initial sample consisted of 12,521 firms. However for 1,478 firms there was no business descripation and hence the firms could not be coded. Additionally 197 firms were classified as pure service firms and were hence irrelevant for this phase of the research. 212 of the remaining 10,846 firms had also declared bankruptcy. Once these three groups are eliminated from the original sample -those with no description, those classified as pure service and those that have declared bankruptcy, the remaining usable sample consists of 10,634 firms. Despite the fact that all of these firms were classified as manufacturing, in terms of their primary SIC codes, 3, 196 (30.05%) of them had servitized. A more detailed breakdown is provided in Table 3 (46.7%) were pure manufacturing firms. As stated previously, the sample as a whole consisted of 30.05% servitized firms and 69.95% pure manufacturing firms. Hence considerably more of the servitized firms had declared bankruptcy than might be expected, suggesting that the transition from a manufacturing firm to a servitized firm might be problematic. In some ways this is not surprising as increased diversification -moving to product and service offerings -might hold some significant challenges for firms, not least because of the increased investment required and changed risk profile. Of course, an alternative explanation is that manufacturing firms already in financial difficulties might chose to servitize in an attempt to escape from their problems. Hence they are more likely to go bankrupt, even before embarking on a strategy of servitization. A more detailed study of the stories behind the bankrupt firms will be necessary to establish whether either of these hypotheses are valid.
Of the usable sample of 10,634 firms, 10,028 firms were incorporated in just 25 countries. Table 4 shows the spread. Countries with less than 60 firms were excluded from the analysis.
Insert Table 4 around here
The data in Table 4 shows some interesting patterns, with the United States (59%); Finland (53%), Singapore (49%), Malaysia (46%) and the Netherlands (40%) having a higher number of servitized firms than other countries. Perhaps, not surprisingly given its recent rate of development, China is the country with the highest number of manufacturing only firms (99%). It is also possible to analyse the countries by the 12 forms of servitization presented in Table 3 . Figure 1 shows the resultant analysis, which highlights the propensity of servitized firms to offer different services in different countries. There are two particularly noteworthy points about the data shown in Figure 3 .
First, the variation in average numbers of services offered by firms across the different countries, ranging from close to 3 different services per firm in the US, to less than 1.5 in the Czech Republic.
Second there are some areas of service offering that appear universally -e.g. design and development services -while others appear to be particularly prevalent in specific countries -e.g. significant variations, so the remainder of this paper turns to the apparent servitization paradoxwhy are servitized firms generating higher revenues, but delivering lower profits than pure manufacturing firms.
Insert Table 5 around here Table 6 presents average financial data for the sample, comparing the cost base of the servitized and pure manufacturing firms. The data show that while the average servitized firm generates total sales revenues of US$ 2.9 billion, it only generates a net profit of US$ 150 million, giving a net profit as a % of total sales revenues of 5.17%. This contrasts with a pure manufacturing firm, which on average generates total revenues of US$ 1.12 billion, with a net profit of US$ 72 million, giving a net profit as a % of total revenue 6.43%.
Exploring the Paradox of Servitization
Insert Table 6 around here
Of the variables listed in Table 6 there are several that are particularly marked, with the most significant being the cost of goods sold (US$ 1.97 billion for servitized firms versus US$ 711 million for the pure manufacturers). Why should the cost of goods sold be so much higher for the servitized firms? It is important to remember that the servitized firms are larger than pure manufacturing firms (as previously discussed). Hence it would be more appropriate to talk in terms of cost of goods sold as a % of total sales revenues. This perspective eliminates the apparent difference between the pure manufacturing and the servizited firms. The cost of goods sold as a % of total revenues for the pure manufacturing firms is 63.46%, while for the servitized firms it is 67.18%.
So what are the substantive differences between the pure manufacturing firms and the servitized firms according to the data in Table 6 . First, employment costs are lower in pure manufacturing firms (US$32,520/employee) than in the servitized firms (US$41,230/employee), although operating revenues per employee are higher in servitized firms (US$370,000/employee), than in the pure manufacturing firms (US$297,000/employee). Second the working capital per employee is lower in pure manufacturing firms (US$59,800/employee) than in the servitized firms (US$69,800/employee). Third the total assets per employee are lower in pure manufacturing firms (US$382,000/employee) than in the servitized firms (US$431,000/employee). Taken together it appears that the reasons net profits as a % of revenues are lower in the servitized firms is that their cost per employee is higher, as is their working capital and the net asset base. In some ways this is not surprising. Staff who can offer consultancy services and/or design complex systems and solutions are likely to be more expensive than staff who have a narrower set of skills and work solely in a manufacturing plant. Offering additional services will require additional assets and hence working capital. The more concerning fact is that firms appear unable to recoup the additional value that might be expected following the investments they have to make to move to a position where they can offer a combination of product and service.
Of course, as already stated the aggregated data hide significant variations and so it is also worth exploring these data at a more disaggregated level. Of particular interest is whether the observed patterns vary either by firm size and/or range of servitization -both of which bring into play questions of economies and dis-economies of scale. If, as the data, suggest servitizing requires incremental investment in staff (hiring more expensive people hence the observed increase in employment costs) and capital (hence the observed increases in net assets and working capital) then one could argue that: (i) larger firms would be more likely to be able to carry and profit from this incremental investment -an economies of scale argument; while the range of servitization would increase the requirement for incremental investment (a dis-economies of scale argument).
To explore this issue a regression analysis is used, where net profit as a % of sales revenues is the dependent variable, while extent of servitization and size of firm are the independent variables. To calculate the extent of servitization a simple classification is used, namely the number of different categories of services offered by each firm from the list of 12 services in Table 3 Table 7 summarises the resultant regression.
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As can be seen from the regression equation, it appears that the extent of servitization (measured in terms of the number of services offered) has a negative impact on 2004 net profit as a % of 2004 sales revenues, while the decision to servitize (at least to some degree) and the size of the firm (measured in terms of numbers of employees) both have a positive impact. Table 8 explores these relationships in more detail, breaking down the sample into deciles of employees and the extent of servitization. As Table 8 shows the decision to servitize (for smaller firms -up to 3000 employees) is statistically significantly associated with higher net profits as a % of sales revenues, but this effect reverses for the largest firms (where in 4 out of 7 cases the pure manufacturing firms achieve statistically significantly higher net profits as a % of sales revenues than do the servitized firms).
Insert table 8 around here
This finding increases in importance when one considers that it is only in the largest decile of firms that the number of servitized firms outweighs the number of pure manufacturing firms. The data suggest that those smaller firms that have not yet servitized might benefit by adding services, yet calls into question how easy it is for larger firms to benefit. Of course this does not mean that servitizing is the wrong strategy for larger firms. The findings merely suggest that larger firms appear to find it difficult to achieve the financial benefits of servitization that might be expected.
The analysis presented in this section has focused on the extent of servitization, making no distinction between the different forms of servitization (and the potential complexity of these) discussed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 (Delbridge et al, 2006) .
Third, the analysis raises some interesting questions about the economic impact of servitization. While servitized firms generate higher revenues they tend to generate lower net profits as a % of revenues than pure manufacturing firms. The reasons for this are that servitized firms have higher average labour costs, working capital and net assets. And they appear unable to generate high enough revenues or margins to cover the additional investment they have to make over and above the investment made by pure manufacturing firms. This finding applies particularly to the largest firms, for while smaller servitized firms (those with less than 3000 employees) often generate higher net profits as a % of sales revenues than their pure manufacturing counterparts, this finding does not hold for larger firms. Indeed for the largest firms, it is the pure manufacturing firms that generate the higher net profits as a % of sales revenues.
This finding is particularly important given current calls from the policy community for manufacturing firms in developed economies to servitize, moving to a position where they offer higher value added products and services. Before abandoning this call, however, it is important to explore in more detail the challenges facing firms, especially large firms, as they seek to servitize.
Several recent papers talk of a services paradox, noting that it often proves more difficult than expected to recoup the expected level of return from services (Gebauer et al, 2005; Reinartz and Ulaga, 2008) . Literature and anecdotal evidence suggests three broad categories of reasons why this might be the case -(i) the challenges of shifting mindsets, (ii) the challenges of timescale and (iii) the challenges of business models/customer offerings. Underlying these three broad categories of challenge are ten factors (summarised in Table 10 Gebauer et al. (2005) , in their study of the German machine tool industry, highlight that one of the reasons the machine tool manufacturers had not able to accrue as much profit from services as they had expected, was that many of the sales staff either gave away services as an incentive to buy the product, or did not see the sale of a $50,000 service contract, as compelling as the sale of a $1 million machine tool. Hence the sales staff tended to put more emphasis on the sale of tangible products rather than services. The third changing mindsets issue relates to the customer. Here the challenge lies in the concept of product ownership. Many customers are emotionally attached to the products they buy -in the consumer market this phenomenon is particularly obvious in the automotive sector. For manufacturing to servitize successfully, customers have to accept that it is not always necessary for them to take ownership of the physical product.
The second broad set of challenges -those of timescale -are a function of the changing Finally, there appear to be challenges in terms of business models and customer offerings.
The debates about value-in-use that dominate the marketing literature highlight the need to understand what value customers and consumers derive from services, rather than define value in terms of the producers' perspective (Vargo and Lusch, 2004) . From an operations perspective, we know relatively little about the design of services and much of our knowledge is grounded in the design and delivery of mass services, although there is now growing interest in experiential services (Roth and Menor, 2003; Voss and Zomerdijk, 2007) . This relative paucity of knowledgeespecially about the design and deliver of complex engineered services -is linked to concerns about our understanding of the organisational capabilities needed for service design and delivery, as well as the challenges of developing a service culture inside a traditional manufacturing business.
Finally, there is a need to understand the transformation journey required to embed the nine factors identified above into a servitized manufacturing firm. Future research, which explores the extent to which these ten challenges together explain the paradox of servitization described in this paper, will surely be worthwhile. Integration orientated product-service systems involve going downstream by adding services through vertical integration. Ownership of the tangible product is still transferred to the customer, but the supplier seeks vertical integration, e.g. by moving into retail and distribution; financial services; consulting services; property and real estate services; and transportation and trucking services. One way of thinking about integration oriented PSS is by thinking of products plus services.
Option 2: Product oriented PSS
With product oriented product-service systems ownership of the tangible product is transferred to the customer, but additional services directly related to the product are provided, e.g. design and development services; installation and implementation services; maintenance and support services; consulting services; outsourcing and operating services; procurement services. One can conceptualise product oriented PSS as products plus services that are integral to the product.
Option 3: Service oriented PSS
Service oriented Product-Service Systems incorporate services into the product itself. Ownership of the tangible product is still transferred to the customer, but additional value added services are offered as an integral part of the offering, e.g. Health Usage Monitoring Systems and Intelligence Vehicle Health Management. Option 3 is the first option which involves a coupled product and service, as opposed to product plus service.
Option 4: Use oriented PSS
Use oriented Product-Service Systems shift focus to the service (which is delivered through product). Often ownership of the tangible product is retained by the service provider, who sells the functions of the product, via modified distribution and payment systems, such as sharing, pooling, and leasing.
Option 5: Result oriented PSS
Result oriented Product-Service Systems seek to replace the product with a service, thereby doing away with the need for the product, or certainly an individually owned product. A classic example would be voicemail services where the service itself replaces the need for individuals to own their own answering machines. < 2 4 , 6 7 4 2 4 , 6 7 4 -4 7 , 8 1 1 4 7 , 8 1 2 -7 8 , 5 3 3 7 8 , 5 3 4 -1 2 4 , 2 4 8 1 2 4 , 2 4 9 -1 9 6 , 5 4 5 1 9 6 , 5 4 6 -3 0 7 , 6 9 9 3 0 7 , 7 0 0 -5 1 9 , 2 0 2 5 1 9 , 2 0 3 -1 0 1 , 1 6 1 1 1 , 0 1 1 , 6 1 2 -2 , 6 9 0 , 8 6 6 > 2 , 6 9 0 , 8 6 6
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